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I.  Banks and Aggregate Credit: What Is New? 
1.  Aggregate Claims of Banks 
During the decade from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2004, banks’ claims on the private sector 
(including loans and securities) increased by 177%, from SAR 113 billion to SAR 313 billion. In the 
same period, banks’ claims on the public sector increased by 129%, from SAR 77 billion to 
SAR 176 billion. Consequently, claims on the public sector declined from 40.5% of total claims to 36%, 
while the private sector’s share of claims has increased from 59.5% to 64%. 
2.  Claims on the Private Sector 
In the private sector, bank credit increased from SAR 107 billion in 1995 to SAR 303 billion in 2004. 
Investment in private securities remained stable and insignificant as it grew from SAR 6.1 billion to 
SAR 10.9 billion during the same period. Within the loans, advances and overdraft segment, the 
greatest increase occurred in the area of loans to consumers and for credit cards. These were less 
than SAR 5 billion in 1995, and by 31 December 2004 they reached SAR 119 billion, an increase of 
24 times. In the same period, credit card loans, which amounted to approximately SAR 2 billion in 
1995 (40% of consumer loans) only increased to SAR 3.3 billion by 2004. Their relative percentage 
declined from 40% to about 3% of total consumer loans. As of end-2004, 3% of total consumer loans 
were for credit cards, 7% were for real estate financing, 24% for cars and equipment and 66% for 
miscellaneous purposes. The trend for growth in consumer loans has continued strongly in 2005, and 
by the end of June total consumer loans were SAR 152.7 billion, of which outstanding credit card 
loans were SAR 3.5 billion (2.3%), real estate financing was SAR 10.9 billion (7.1%), car and 
equipment loans were SAR 29.1 (19.1%) and miscellaneous loans were 109.1 (71.5%). The 
miscellaneous loans include loans taken for durable consumer goods, education, travel and shares 
trading. 
3.  Reasons for Growth in Consumer Loans 
The underlying reasons for this rapid growth in consumer loans are as follows: 
1.  A youthful and rapidly growing population that wishes to finance automobiles, education, 
vacations, housing, shares trading, etc.  
2.  The ability of Saudi banks to secure an assignment of salary for consumer loans. This 
collateral has been designed through the creation of an interbank payment system that 
permits the transfer of customer salaries from employers to any bank account in the 
Kingdom. Thus, banks can secure their loans by a tripartite agreement between the 
employer, the employee and the bank which gives the bank a first right on the customer 
salary. This has been the key catalyst for the rapid development of consumer finance. 
3.  The establishment of the Saudi Credit Bureau, which provides banks with up to date 
information on customers’ creditworthiness. 
4.  Banks have also introduced new types of consumer loans for margin trading (secured by 
shares) and loans secured by real estate. 
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4.  Private Sector Claims by Economic Activity 
The table below shows the major areas of growth in bank credit, by economic activity. 
 
Table 1 
Bank Credit by Economic Activity 
  January 
1995 
December 
2004  Increase  % 
Increase 
Agriculture and Fishing  2.7  3.8  1.1  41 
Manufacturing and Processing  12.9 26.6 13.7 106 
Mining  0.8 1.3 0.5 62 
Electricity  and  Water  2.6 3.3 0.7 27 
Building and Construction  14.1  23.1  9.0  64 
Commerce  28.3 62.8 34.5 122 
Transport and Communication  6.2  13.4  7.2  116 
Finance  8.4 33.8 25.4 302 
Service 3.8  12.3  8.5  223 
Miscellaneous 27.3  122.8  95.5  349 
Total  107.1 303.1 196.0  183 
 
It is evident from the above that the greatest increase (349%) was in the miscellaneous category, 
which was 40.5% of total private sector credit, of which a substantial portion was represented by 
consumer loans (73%). As already noted above, this economic activity was the area of fastest growth. 
Another area of rapid growth (30%) was the finance sector, which, apart from the banks, now includes 
insurance companies, mutual funds, leasing companies and other finance sector related entities. 
Finance sector activities also include those related to share trading. While the service sector also 
showed a sharp increase of 223% in the decade, its overall volume was relatively small (about 3.5% of 
total credit). Other economic sectors, such as commerce, transport and communications, and 
manufacturing and processing, doubled in the decade, but their relative size in the overall credit 
extension declined. There was little growth in the agriculture and fishing sector due to the cutback in 
government subsidies. Also, the electricity, water and utilities sector declined due to a mature utilities 
infrastructure which did not require major new investments. 
5.  Extension of Credit to the Public Sector 
During the period 1995-2004, claims on the public sector increased from SAR 77 billion to 




Bank Claims on the Public Sector 
(1995-2004) 
 1995  2004  Increase  %  Increase 
Total 77  176    99    193 
Loans and Advances  27  29    2    7.5 
Treasury Bills  11  0.3    (10.73)    (97) 
Government Bonds  39  146    107    274 BIS Papers No 28  329
 
The Table 2 indicates that the volume of loans to public sector enterprise did not increase by much in 
the last decade. This could be largely attributed to the strong fiscal position of the government, which 
has been able to finance many of the government sector projects from its own resources. 
6.  Changes in Banks’ Holdings of Government Securities 
In terms of government securities, the popularity of treasury bills declined considerably due to the 
introduction of the Saudi Riyal Interbank Express System introduced in 1996. Also, there is greater 
flexibility in the government bonds market, where SAMA has permitted banks to repo up to 75% of 
their holdings. Nevertheless, government bonds were popular as an investment vehicle and increased 
by 274% in the decade. Their popularity can be attributed to strong yields, help in maintaining liquidity, 
ability to repo and the development of a secondary market. While the growth in total government 
securities was about 193% over the decade, their relative share in overall credit declined by about 5%. 
This is because in the last 3 years, the government’s fiscal situation improved significantly due to a 
rise in oil prices and non-oil revenue, and there was a decline in the government offering of securities 
in the market. Part of the government surplus was targeted towards repayment of government debt, 
which is almost all in form of government securities. 
7.  Banks’ Sources of Funds  
During the decade 1995-2004, bank deposits increased from SAR 188 billion to SAR 422 billion, an 
increase of SAR 234 billion (125%), while capital and reserves increased by 109%. The table below 
indicates the changes: 
 
 1995  2004  Increase  %  Increase 
Demand 81  203  122  151 
Time and Saving  51  136  85  167 
Other Quasi-Monetary  56  83  27  48 
Total Deposits  188  422  234  125 
Foreign Liabilities  39  46  7  18 
Capital and Reserves  33  69  36  109 
Other Liabilities  72  118  46  64 
Total 332  655  323  86 
 
8.  Changes in Deposit Structure 
In terms of funding sources, by end-2004, the relative share of demand deposits to total deposits 
increased to 48% (1994 - 43%) and the share of time and savings deposits also increased to 32% 
(1994 - 27%). There was a decline in other quasi-monetary deposits, which dropped from 30% to 20% 
as a percentage of total deposits. The major reasons for these changes include: 
•  Greater demand for Islamic (non-interest) banking services. Consequently, demand deposits 
showed rapid growth, increasing by 151% the decade. 
•  Time and savings deposits also increased, particularly as businesses and public sector 
entities use such deposits to generate income for their enterprise. 
•  A decline came about in foreign currency deposits, which indicates that Saudi banks have 
ample liquidity and are relying less on regional and international markets to raise liquidity. 
There has been a noticeable decline in foreign currency interbank activities. 
•  Only the outstanding remittance balances in the other deposits increased by over 200%, but 
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9.  Changes in Share Capital and Reserves 
Apart from deposits as a source of funding, Saudi banks increased their capital and reserves by 109% 
during the decade. Total capital and reserves increased from SAR 33 billion to SAR 69 billion. This 
was done by means of new flotations of shares as well as retention of profits. 
10. Long-Term  Funding 
A recent but growing trend which started in 2004 and is becoming increasingly popular for Saudi 
banks is to raise long-term funds in the international markets. These take the form of syndicated loans, 
Eurobonds and notes. In the past two years, almost half a dozen substantial transactions of this type 
have been carried out, and others are in progress. This trend will have an increasing impact on banks’ 
activities in future years and will enable them to grow their operations. 
II.  An Evaluation of Major Structural Changes: Increased Role of Foreign 
Banks 
1.  Evolution of the Banking System and Foreign Banks’ Participation 
Foreign banks’ presence in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to 1926, when the Netherlands Trading 
Company, later to become Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN) began operations. It enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly until the late 1940s. In 1947, Banque Indo Chine opened a branch, followed by the Arab 
Bank Limited (1949), the British Bank of the Middle East (1950) and the National Bank of Pakistan 
(1950). In October 1952, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established by the Saudi 
government with primary responsibility for monetary stability. Following SAMA’s creation, the 
government followed an open and liberal policy and permitted the opening of new foreign bank 
branches, including Banque de Caire, Banque du Liban et d’Outremer and First National City Bank of 
New York. This first wave of foreign banks linked Saudi Arabia firmly with the global financial markets 
and encouraged a competitive domestic environment. During this period, three domestic banks were 
also licensed. The National Commercial Bank was licensed in 1953, Riyad Bank started operations in 
1957 and Al-Watany Bank in January 1958. 
2.  Conversion of Foreign Bank Branches to Joint Stock Companies 
By 1975, 10 international banks with 29 branches were present in the Kingdom. These institutions 
operated as branches of their parent companies but, in 1976, a decision was taken by the Saudi 
government that these should become incorporated as local banks with majority Saudi shareholdings. 
The major reason for this important policy decision was that with the boom in oil revenues in the 
mid-1970s, the Saudi economy expanded and grew very rapidly. This led to sharp rise in demand for 
banking products and services which the existing banks found difficult to cope with. The government 
quickly recognized the need for larger and more sophisticated banks. It also observed that capital 
invested in the banking sector was insufficient and inhibited banks from investing in branch networks, 
implementing new technology and training human resources. While the government encouraged all 
foreign banks to invest more capital, it realized their constraints and also noted that many local 
investors were ready to make large capital investments for developing the banking system. 
Consequently, in 1976 the Council of Ministers (the final legislative authority) offered foreign banks 
operating in the Kingdom a chance to form joint venture banks with Saudi shareholders. This decision 
required foreign banks to convert their branch operations to Saudi joint stock companies in which they 
could retain up to a 40% shareholding. In subsequent years, all foreign banks accepted these 
proposals and formed joint ventures as there were a number of incentives offered, including the 
following: 
•  The new joint venture banks were accorded full national treatment at par with fully owned 
Saudi banks. They were permitted to rapidly expand their branch networks and to access all 
the benefits and privileges available to local banks. BIS Papers No 28  331
 
•  The foreign partners were offered and encouraged to take on Technical Management 
Agreements for the operation of joint venture banks. Thus, they exercised considerable 
management influence over the banks’ affairs and continued to provide human, technical 
and other expertise and resources. 
•  All joint venture banks were given a tax-free holiday period of five years from the dates of 
their conversion. These tax-free periods were subsequently extended for an additional five 
years. 
•  The creation of joint stock Saudi banks whose shares were held by a large number of 
investors also contributed to the development of the Saudi shares market as bank shares 
quickly became popular among investors. This further contributed to the increase in value of 
investments owned by foreign shareholders. 
•  The conversion of foreign bank branches into joint venture banks also had prudential 
implications as the move permitted all banks to substantially increase their capital base. This 
helped banks to stay liquid and creditworthy despite the subsequent domestic and 
international economic turbulences they faced in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Following these changes, during the period from 1982 to 2000, no new foreign or domestic banks 
except one were granted a license, as the government believed that the country was adequately 
served by the existing branch network. During the 1990s, the banking system made large investments 
in the payment systems infrastructure and in technology-based customer products and services. 
These include automated teller machines, point of sales terminals, telephone and internet banking, 
electronic share trading, etc. Consequently, while the banking system expanded greatly in size and 
scope of its activities, there was only limited expansion in the banks’ branch network. Nevertheless, 
the Saudi banking system currently has a presence of more than a dozen foreign bank shareholders 
from many parts of the world. Their shareholdings range from less than 1% to 40% of a bank’s total 
capital. In addition, there are international banks with full branch operations. 
3.  Recent Policy Developments for Participation of Foreign Banks 
The Saudi Arabian financial system has always been open to foreign presence. The government has 
encouraged this policy to promote trade, investment and economic relations, and to attract expertise 
and technology. It already has considerable foreign investor presence as eight of the eleven banks 
have substantial foreign ownership. Many of the foreign partners in Saudi joint venture banks have 
technical management agreements. In past five years, Saudi Arabia has licensed a number of GCC 
(Gulf Cooperation Council) banking institutions, as a result of a decision of the GCC Summit to permit 
reciprocal opening of their banking markets. In this connection, Gulf International Bank of Bahrain was 
granted a license in September 2000 to open a branch in Saudi Arabia. This was followed by the grant 
of branch licenses to the Emirates Bank International, the National Bank of Kuwait, the National Bank 
of Bahrain and Bank Muscat. Two of these banks are already operational, while the other three are 
planning to commence operations over the next 12 months. 
The government has also decided to allow major international banks from different parts of the world 
to obtain banking licenses. To this end, branch banking licenses have been granted to three major 
international banks: BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan Chase. These banks are now in the 
process of opening their branches. More recently, in August 2005, Saudi Arabia granted branch 
licenses to two regional banks: National Bank of Pakistan and State Bank of India, which are expected 
to become operational in 2006. 
It should be noted that with the opening of the branches of these new foreign banks by end-2006, the 
number of licensed banks in the Kingdom will have doubled since 2000. The entrance of these 
institutions into the Saudi banking market should enhance competition, support the transfer of 
technology, improve financial services in all sectors and create employment opportunities. This is part 
of the Saudi government’s vision for a dynamic financial sector which will also benefit from the 
participation of non-bank investment and brokerage companies under the recent Capital Market Law, 
and the participation of insurance companies under the new Cooperative Insurance Law. 332  BIS Papers No 28
 
III.  Preventing Banking System Crisis: Capital Regulations and 
Supervisory Oversight 
1. Introduction 
The genesis of a modern banking system in Saudi Arabia has its roots in the creation in October 1952 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) with primary responsibility for monetary policy. In 
1956, SAMA was granted a new charter with added responsibilities for banking supervision. The 
charter granted SAMA a great deal of independence and authority.  
2. Growing  Pains 
The first banking problems faced by Saudi Arabia took place in 1960. Riyad Bank and Al-Watany 
Bank, which had commenced operations in 1957 and 1959 respectively, faced serious liquidity 
problems arising from mismanagement and improper loans by board members in both banks. By 
1960, Al-Watany Bank was technically insolvent and was unable to settle the claims of local 
depositors. SAMA liquidated the bank to organize a merger with Riyad Bank, and with the 
government’s approval, SAMA, on behalf of the government, acquired 38% of the shares of the new 
Riyad Bank. These events tested the government’s resolve to defend the stability of the nascent 
banking system. The government not only took action, requiring a merger, but also came in strongly as 
a shareholder to prevent a bank failure. This sent a clear signal that Saudi authorities wanted to 
maintain and fully support a strong, stable and credible banking system. Notwithstanding the 
government’s ownership stake, Riyad Bank continued to operate as a private sector institution with no 
major intervention from the authorities. 
3.  Strengthening of the Regulatory Framework 
These banking difficulties led to a new Banking Control Law in 1966, which gave SAMA broad 
supervisory powers to license and regulate all banks. Banks were required to meet stringent capital 
adequacy, liquidity, lending ratio and reserve requirements. A system of on- and off-site prudential 
supervision was introduced, and SAMA strengthened its supervisory capabilities. The law also 
supported the concept of a universal banking model, which permitted banks to provide a broad range 
of financial services, including banking investments, securities, etc. Consequently, banks became the 
primary licensed financial institutions and expanded rapidly, covering the entire country. 
4.  Trials and Tribulations 
The 1980s were a tumultuous and testing period for Saudi banks and the banking system. In line with 
the tremendous increase in government revenues in 1979-1981 and subsequent slow-down in 1982-
1986, the Kingdom’s commercial banks saw rapid expansion followed by a difficult period of 
adjustment, deterioration in asset quality and retrenchment. 
As oil prices tumbled from an all-time high in 1981 and continued to decline during the next five years, 
there was significant pressure on the quality of bank assets, which deteriorated with the economic 
slowdown. Credit to the private sector, which had increased over 500% during the period 1976-1981, 
only grew at a rate of less than 4% per year over the next five years. The banks suffered from 
non-performing loans, which increased to over 20% of all loans by 1986. Banks’ profits suffered 
significantly, and loan loss provisions for doubtful accounts for the banking system had risen to over 
12% of total loans. 
5.  Causes of the Banking Problems 
The causes of the problems faced by Saudi banks arose mainly from the macroeconomic imbalances 
which were created by a steep rise in government revenues in 1979-1981, followed by a precipitous 
decline in oil revenues. Government revenues, which had risen to SAR 333 billion by 1981, started a 
rapid decline and dropped to just over SAR 74 billion by 1987. The rapid growth in bank assets and 
liquidity in late 1970s and early 1980s had given rise to a sharp increase in demand for private sector 
credit. Some banks expanded too rapidly, and did not have adequate credit assessment and 
monitoring procedures. They also lacked required technical expertise, faced a shortage of qualified 
human resources and had inadequate technology. Consequently, when the steep decline in the 
economy occurred, many companies and businesses suffered from a lack of liquidity and faced a BIS Papers No 28  333
 
credit crunch. The construction and contracting sectors that had boomed earlier faced the biggest 
setback, and many projects were affected. Banks had difficulties recovering their loans, and the 
collateral in many cases proved to be difficult to realize. 
6.  The Government’s Response 
During this period, SAMA, in concert with the Minister of Finance, took a number of steps to ensure 
the stability of the financial system and to help the banks to overcome the prolonged economic 
downturn. These included the following; 
1.  Banks were required by SAMA to seek its approval prior to announcing their dividends. The 
Banking Control Law requires all banks to build their statutory reserves equal to their share 
capital. SAMA further encouraged Saudi banks to build additional reserves to strengthen 
their capital base. 
2.  Most foreign shareholders in Saudi banks enjoyed a tax holiday for the first five years of their 
ownership. To encourage retention of profits, the tax holiday was extended in most cases by 
another five years, after which a deferred tax scheme was permitted.  
3.  In 1986, SAMA obtained a ruling from the Tax Department that permitted the tax deduction 
of loan loss provisions on an accrual basis. This encouraged banks to increase their loan 
loss provisions for doubtful accounts. 
4.  To encourage Saudi banks to increase their interbank dealings and to support the 
development of a riyal interbank market, a tax ruling was obtained which exempted foreign 
banks from withholding taxes when carrying out interbank transactions with Saudi Banks. 
5.  SAMA recognized the need to encourage banks to take strong steps to improve their risk 
management and control procedures. Consequently, it took major initiatives in the area of 
corporate governance, requiring banks to develop internal audit departments and implement 
internal controls. 
7.  Major Supervisory Initiatives of the 1990s 
Following the difficulties of the 1980s, in the next decade SAMA embarked on a policy of modernizing 
its supervisory system. The first objective of these policies was to create a suitable infrastructure that 
required sound corporate governance of banks; a second objective was to introduce international 
supervisory standards and best practices. In this regard, SAMA issued a range of supervisory 
requirements, including internal control guidelines for banks, SAMA accounting standards (these were 
subsequently replaced by IFRS in 1992), fraud prevention guidelines, anti-money laundering 
guidelines, operational risk guidelines, establishment of the role of audit committees, and external 
auditors, etc. All of these guidelines were aimed at inculcating a culture of sound corporate 
management and enhancement of internal controls. In tandem, SAMA introduced a number of 
supervisory standards emanating from the Basel Committee. These included the 1988 Basel Capital 
Adequacy Accord (1992), the large exposure standard (1994) and a number of other Basel circulars 
dealing with liquidity, interest rate risk, credit risk, market risk, etc. 
In the 1990s SAMA also implemented an electronic (prudential) returns management system, which 
provides it with important and significant prudential information for use in on- and off-site supervisory 
functions. Also, following the pronouncement of Basel Core Principles in 1997, SAMA continued to 
review and evaluate its supervisory practices to ensure that these not only met but exceeded 
international standards. 
It is noteworthy that in 1990s the quality of management in the banking sector had improved 
significantly due to the bad experiences of the 1980s. Consequently, despite the Russian crisis, the 
bond market crisis, and the Southeast Asian banking crisis in the 1990s, there was no major impact on 
the performance of Saudi banks. Also, the banking system coped well with the volatilities of the prices 
in the oil market; no bank was threatened in this period and no government support was required. 334  BIS Papers No 28
 
8.  Capital Adequacy in the Saudi Banking System 
In line with international trends, in 1992 SAMA implemented the risk-weighted Basel Capital Adequacy 
Accord, and established a minimum risk-weighted capital standard of 8%. Also, SAMA encouraged 
Saudi banks to raise their capital bases, and during the period 1988-1993, 7 of 12 banks increased 
their capital through new share flotations. As a result, the capital base of the banking system doubled, 
from SAR 15 billion to SAR 30 billion. It is worth noting that the average risk-based capital of the Saudi 
banking system in the 1990s hovered around the 20% level, while individual bank averages were 
between 12-30%. It is also notable that the banks’ capital was almost entirely, composed of Tier 1 
items. In this connection, SAMA has decided that Saudi banks will implement the Basel II Capital 
Adequacy Standard during the period 2008-2010. Banks are free to choose any Basel II approach for 
credit and operational risk. Work is currently underway to plan for the implementation of all three pillars 
of Basel II during this time frame. 
9.  Supervisory Initiatives in the New Decade  
In the decade starting in 2001, the trend towards further enhancement of the supervisory system has 
continued. SAMA has developed and implemented a range of financial policies and supervisory 
standards to ensure that the banking system maintains its reputation, safety and soundness. Some of 
the major supervisory policies introduced since 2001 include the following. 
•  A new anti-money laundering law. 
•  New regulations for prevention of money laundering and for combating terrorist financing. 
•  Implementation of a risk-based supervisory system to support on- and off-site supervision. 
•  Implementation of Market Risk Amendments to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (now part of 
the Basel II Capital Accord). 
•  Implementation of supervisory rules for consumer loans and margin trading. 
•  A host of other Basel circulars, including those on credit and operational risks. 
10.  External Assessment of Financial Policies and Supervision 
These financial policies and supervisory practices have gone a long way to strengthen the Saudi 
financial system. In addition, since 2003 SAMA’s supervisory practices and financial policies have 
been assessed by three independent outside expert institutions. These include: 
•  External rating agencies: S&P and Fitch carried out extensive work on the financial system 
for their sovereign rating work in 2003. SAMA scored well in their assessment of the strength 
of the financial sector and its supervision. 
•  A Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was done by an IMF/World Bank team in 
2004. The results of this FSAP were comforting, in that Saudi Arabia’s financial policies and 
supervisory practices stood up to this objective evaluation. The assessment against Basel 
Core Principles indicated that SAMA supervision was fully or mostly compliant with 21 of 25 
Core Principles. Also as a part of the FSAP, a stress test was carried out under three 
different scenarios of interest rate, credit risk and liquidity shocks. This stress test confirmed 
the resilience of the banking system as no Saudi bank would fail under a 300% stress 
scenario for these individual shocks or even a combined shock. 
•  Also in 2004, a Financial Action Task Force study was carried out to assess Saudi Arabia 
against the 48 recommendations issued by FATF. The results of this study were very 
satisfactory as Saudi Arabia fully or mostly met 47½ of the 48 FATF recommendations. 
11.  The Way Forward  
The sustained long-term growth and development of the Saudi banking system has been supported by 
a strong and comprehensive system of banking supervision. Since the 1960s, SAMA has enjoyed 
broad regulatory powers in licensing banks, approving their activities and taking prompt corrective 
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all areas, including capital adequacy, liquidity, lending limits, credit and market risk, etc. Also, it has 
powers to conduct both on- and off-site supervision. SAMA acts as the regulator of the insurance 
market and has a dual role of providing central payment and settlement services and for the oversight 
of these systems. Over the years, SAMA has used its broad supervisory powers effectively to ensure 
that the Saudi banking system continues to enjoy a high reputation for soundness and stability in the 
international financial markets. Looking ahead, systemic stability continues to be the primary goal of 
Saudi authorities in general, and SAMA in particular, for the banking system. 